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IMAGINATION, MORALITY, AND THE SPECTRE OF SADE IN GEORGE 
ELIOT'S ROMOLA AND DANIEL DERONDA 
By Margaux Fragoso 
In her final book, Impressions of Theophrastus Such, George Eliot vocalizes her contempt for 
writers who dismiss morality 'as a sort of twaddle for bibs and tuckers, a doctrine of dulness, 
a mere incident in human stupidity' (Impressions 134). It is well known that Eliot subscribed 
to a complex system of morals that each successive novel brings closer to fruition. Eliot's last 
novel Daniel Deronda is her closest inspection of the conflict between egoism and morality. It 
explores the psyche of a woman who is made to develop moral sensibilities: Gwendolen's 
'bad' luck in marrying Grandcourt creates conditions that foster her spiritual and moral growth. 
Romola presents an inversion of this theme: Tito Melema is the recipient of many 'lucky' 
occurrences such as political connections, marriage to a beautiful wife, money; all of this 
assists in the cultivation of evil in Tito: every success leads him farther from any kind of 
redemption. With all this emphasis on contingency, it should come as no surprise that Daniel 
Deronda opens with Gwendolen at a roulette table losing her money: unlike Tito she will suffer 
a run of bad luck, and also unlike Tito, she will have an opportunity to redeem herself. 
The Marquis de Sade also deals with issues of contingency, destiny, and morality but unlike 
Eliot, Sade sees morality as a static trait, which is clearly illustrated in lustine, or the 
Misfortunes of Virtue, 1787. Bad luck and the resultant agonies at the hands of her malefactors 
produce no palpable change in the victimized Iustine's code of unceasingly ineffective moral 
principles. As noted above, Eliot presents the acquisition of morality as a lifelong process often 
facilitated by suffering. To her, morality is dynamic and ever-changing: an initially kind-
hearted character such as Tito may become evil due to poor choices; and inversely, an egoistic 
and sometimes cruel person like Gwendolen Harleth can develop a system of morals. Sade 
portrays morality as consistently flat and empty as a value: despite incredible torture, the 
virtuous Iustine's morals are fixed; she never adapts her morality to suit the demands her 
environment presses on her. To Sade, morality is a form of idiocy, even lunacy; whereas to 
Eliot, morality is the highest form of intelligence and creative capacity: characters like 
Dorothea and Maggie, both presented as intrinsically moral, continue to adjust their moral 
systems based on the needs unsuitable environments have engendered in them: Dorothea 
marries the morally inferior Will, Maggie continues to visit Philip in the Red Deeps in direct 
opposition to her brother's wishes. Eliot views morality as an active force directly linked with 
and fed by the imagination while Sade perceives the opposite: it is immorality that is based on 
the imaginative faculties; morality lacks any creative agency and is therefore incapable of 
invention. Their systems are so diametrically opposed that reading Sade in conjunction with 
Eliot creates a compelling dialectic: what is the relationship of morality to imagination? 
I will now point to evidence that suggests Eliot read Sade and was perhaps even influenced by 
his work. In the chapter, 'Moral Swindlers' of Impressions, Eliot in the voice of Theophrastus, 
puts forth the proposition: 
Suppose a Frenchman-I mean no disrespect to the great French nation, for all 
nations are afflicted with their peculiar parasitic growths which are lazy, 
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hungry forms, usually characterized by a disproportionate swallowing 
apparatus: suppose a Parisian who should shuffle down the Boulevard with a 
soul ignorant of the gravest cares and the deepest tenderness of manhood, and 
a frame more or less fevered by debauchery, mentally polishing into utmost 
refinement of phrase and rhythm verses which were an enlargement on that 
Shaksperian motto, and worthy of the most expensive title to be furnished by 
the vendors of such authentic ware as Les marguerites de l'Enfer, or Les 
Delicacies de Beelzebuth. (135-136) 
Editor Nancy Henry points out that these are mock variations of Baudelaire's poems; however, 
Les Delicacies de Beezlebuth could also refer to Sade's La Philosophie dans le Boudoir or 
Justine, ou Les Malheurs de la Vertu. Indeed, Eliot finds fault with several French authors as 
indicated by the plural 'parasitic growths' and in Debasing the Moral Currency, she observes 
'that even now much nonsense and bad taste win admiring acceptance solely by virtue of the 
French language' (81). 
As a lover of French culture, it comes as no surprise that Eliot would familiarize herself with 
its decadent underbelly. The Oxford Reader's Companion to George Eliot asserts that Eliot saw 
French literature as 'one of the three greatest literatures in the world together with English and 
German' (RignallI27) and that 'her knowledge of it, acquired through a lifetime's reading was 
unrivalled among English writers of her time' (127). Steven Marcus claims in The Other 
Victorians that 'French pornographic writings, particularly those by Sade' were 'well known 
through the upper reaches of English literary society' (Marcus 37). According to Colette 
Michael's annotated bibliography The Marquis de Sade: The Man, His Works and His Critics 
most of Sade's major work was published in the late eighteenth century or the early to mid 
nineteenth century; and Eliot, who visited France frequently, could have easily accessed it. This 
essay will only address works by Sade that were published early enough for Eliot to have read. 
Returning to the central issue at hand which is to establish a dialectic between Sade and Eliot 
that will illustrate both the thematic similarities and philosophical divergences of their work, I 
will now turn to Romola published in 1862, and Daniel Deronda, 1876. These novels are 
inverted versions of the same moral dilemma. Tito, assisted by a favourable destiny, follows 
his basest instincts (in a truly Sadiean fashion, I may add) and becomes successful but also 
unredeemable: a state which is to Romola, and presumably to George Eliot, 'a sorrow that has 
no balm in it and that may well make a man say,-"It would have been better for me if I had 
never been born'" (Romola 538). Daniel Deronda, instead of being about the spiritual ruin that 
is a consequence of egoism, is rather about the birth of conscience that comes from the 
destruction of a pathological egotism: this is presented as positive just as Tito's corruption is 
obviously negative. 
Sade reverses the tenets of this kind of basic morality tale. His major works Juliette, 1797, and 
Justine, 1787, are inverted versions of the same story and serve to illustrate, as Maurice 
Blanchot contends, 'the basic tenet, the very cornerstone of his work: to Virtue, nothing but 
misfortune; to vice the reward of constant prosperity' (Blanchot 44). The converse destinies of 
the righteous Justine and her immoral sister Juliette support Sade's conviction that the person 
'of absolute egoism can never fall upon evil days', that he or she will 'without exception be 
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forever happy and happy to the highest degree' (Blanchot 45). In George Eliot, the opposite 
holds true: the egoist's luck always runs out and he inevitably falls victim to the machinery of 
events set in motion by his own crimes. A single evil deed will follow one forever, regardless 
of any attempt at reconciliation; we see this in Gwendolen, who at the end of Daniel Deronda 
cries out in despair, 'I said I should be forsaken. I am a cruel woman. And I am forsaken' 
(Deronda 803). Gwendolen is constantly haunted by 'distasteful miserable memories which 
forced themselves on her as something more real and ample than new material out of which 
she could mould her future' (797). She will never be free from the twofold effects of her 
crimes: they have altered her destiny by causing a permanent rift between herself and Daniel, 
whom she loves, and they have created within her a superego not unlike the inner critic that 
Theophrastus in Impressions identifies as the 'God within, holding the mirror and the scourge' 
(Impressions 13). Compare Eliot's idea of the retributive effects of destiny and conscience to 
Sade's rhetoric: 'If misery persecutes virtue and prosperity accompanies crime, those two 
things being one in Nature's view, far better to join company with the wicked who flourish, 
than to be counted among the virtuous who flounder?' (Seaver and Wainhouse 457). 
This Sadiean logic is certainly present in Tito when he chooses the easier route of evil although 
destiny has intruded: 'He had simply chosen to make life easy to himself-to carry his human 
lot, in such a way that it would pinch him nowhere; and the choice had, in various times, landed 
him in unexpected positions' (Romola 213). To Sade, the decision to choose evil, as Tito does, 
is the wisest choice because it is natural; to act against nature, or impulse, is to defy an inherent 
natural logic. In Romola, however, Eliot deconstructs the notion of intellect or imagination as 
it relates to the decision to choose evil. Ostensibly, Tito's choice is one that requires intellect; 
he must use his imagination to continue to deceive: Eliot refers to these imaginative capacities 
as 'the resources of lying' (213) and allows us to see that Tito perceives these resources as a 
form of 'ingenuity' (212). So we have no doubt that Eliot, even with her firm sense of what is 
moral, can see the artistic and creative properties innate in deception and other forms of 
immorality. However, while acknowledging this, Eliot also disparages the artistic quality of 
immorality by calling the choice to lie 'easy' and 'habitual' (213). Both these adjectives 
indicate that Eliot sees Tito's prepared course of action as not only morally reprehensible, but 
also intellectually and imaginatively stunting: Tito's immoral choices reduce him to a 
mechanistic impulse that follows a pre-scripted destiny to its unfortunate end. The narrator 
articulates Tito's best possible recourse: he should seek out Baldassarre again and confess his 
crimes to Romola (212). Because this choice requires the most imagination, and Tito lacks this 
capacity, he 'never (thinks) of that' (212). Romola's narrator also suggests that 'repentance 
which cuts off all moorings to evil demands something more than selfish fear' (212) and though 
this 'something' is not overtly stated, we can safely conjecture that the narrator is talking about 
the kind of intelligence that only arises with moral awareness. In Impressions, Eliot takes a firm 
stance on this issue when she meditates on the dissolution of morality within popular art: 'One 
[absurdity] is, the notion that there is a radical, irreconcilable opposition between intellect and 
morality' (134). 
If Sade and others like him value the argument that immorality is the highest form of art, we 
will see the foundation of this kind of philosophy undercut again and again by close 
examination of Eliot's texts. The fact that the choice to be altruistic requires the imagination is 
one that Eliot first explores in The Lifted Veil. Narrated by the socially alienated Latimer, the 
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purpose of this story is to prove that even if one were able to see into the thoughts and emotions 
of others, this gift would be worthless without the imagination required to obtain a sense of 
fellowship. A precursor to the outward malevolence of Grandcourt, Latimer's thoughts are an 
exposition of how someone like Grandcourt would perceive the world. Compare Latimer's 
view of humanity to Grandcourt's: 
when the rational talk, the graceful attentions, the wittily-turned phrases, and 
the kindly deeds which used to make the web of their characters, were seen as 
thrust asunder by a microscopic vision, that showed all the immediate 
frivolities, all the suppressed egoism, all the struggling chaos of puerilities, 
meanness, vague capricious memories and indolent make-shift thoughts, from 
which human words and deeds emerge like leaflets covering a fermenting heap. 
(Veil 14) 
[Grandcourt's] mind was much furnished with a sense of what brutes his fellow 
creatures were, both masculine and feminine, what odious familiarities they 
had, what smirks, what modes of flourishing their handkerchiefs, what 
costume, what lavender water, what bulging eyes, and what foolish notions of 
making themselves agreeable by remarks which were not wanted. (Deronda 
671) 
While Latimer remains passive in his disdain for humanity, Grandcourt channels this negative 
energy into a form of creativity that consists of tormenting others. Both above ideologies are 
Sadiean in their construction. The evolution from the innocuous Latimer to the malicious 
Grandcourt shows that in her final novel, Eliot is ready to explore the kind of evil that is 
derived from such a view of humanity. Latimer's identity is built upon the fact that he fancies 
himself a poet, but Grandcourt has no identity except his inert role as 'gentleman' and this leads 
to a dangerous kind of boredom. 
The creative possibilities of evil are limitless and this is one of the arguments Sade uses to 
construct a claim that evil is derived from the creative intellect. He builds this argument by 
displaying the variety of tortures the imagination can invent and justifying these inventions by 
identifying them as products of nature. Clement in Justine uses promotion of freedom and 
imagination as a cover for the horrors that will surely come about if man is allowed to follow 
whatever base invention his mind can conjure up and rationalize it as creative: 'If we admit that 
the senses' joy is always dependent upon the imagination, one must not be amazed by the 
numerous variations the imagination is apt to suggest' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 601). 
Clement goes on to talk about 'tastes' and pages later, it is revealed that one's personal taste 
can certainly include brutality, for how is one to condemn a man for personal taste? According 
to Clement, the 'voluptuous egoist' is 'persuaded [that] his pleasures will be keen insofar as 
they are entire' (606); this need for a sense of fullness within self affords him the right to 
impose 'the strongest possible dose of pain upon the employed object.' The egoist's existence 
is confirmed by the sensations, painful or pleasurable, that he produces in another being; since 
pain creates more of an emotional response and is therefore a more authentic confirmation, it 
is preferable to the sadist to cause pain. Without this sense of mastery over the beings that 
reflect back to him his own presence, this kind of egoist has no sense of self to speak of, no 
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way of exerting his imagination. 
This kind of worldview can be most directly applied to Grandcourt but as mentioned 
previously, the meditations necessary to form his character germinated in Eliot's earlier egoists. 
Latimer's self-absorption results in shuddering disgust for humankind, a shrinking of the self 
ever inward. In Romola, the egoist in question, Tito, is more interested in producing 
pleasurable effects on others than painful ones and to be loved rather than hated; ironically, his 
desire to obtain the kind of acceptance that will allow his ego to prosper creates his need to 
deceive others. Though Tito's intention is to be loved, Eliot does not fail to see the egoism 
inherent in both the need to create favourable feelings in others and in Grandcourt's case, to 
design torments that will allow his will to flourish through its sense of mastery. Both forms of 
egoism are presented as equally destructive and in both cases, the characters die because of the 
vengeances they have inspired (though in Grandcourt's case, it is not made certain whether he 
was murdered or simply allowed to die, but in either case, he would have lived had Gwendolen 
not wished his death). 
Clement admits that 'the most extraordinary thing is to find admirers' (601) but he attempts to 
decide what should be the recourse of those who 'know full well they are not loved or not 
lovable' (605). To Sade, the solution to this dilemma involves the relinquishment of the need 
for love and the ability to settle instead for 'isolated enjoyment' (604), or enjoyment that is 
limited solely to the gratification of one's own ego, disregarding the other's ego completely in 
its appetites. Tito most explicitly demonstrates that if the egoist's wish for adoration is not 
satisfied through love, he will resort to holding power over another person. It is Tito's 
conclusion when confronted with his wife's loss of love for him that 'marriage must be a 
relation either of sympathy or conquest' (Romola 391). This idea is also explored in Daniel 
Deronda: 'In this critical view of mankind there was an affinity between [Grandcourt] and 
Gwendolen' (671). This affinity vanishes when her feeling of kinship changes to scorn. It is the 
perception of Gwendolen's growing connection to her fellow beings that makes Grandcourt 
more aware of the freakishness of his own alienated state. We can speculate that Grandcourt's 
consciousness is occasionally penetrated by flashes of his difference, and thereby, separation 
from, the human race. The person that cannot connect in any other way will attempt extremes 
in order to forge a union: this is Clement's point when he presents the question: 'How should 
the aged or so many deformed or defective persons be able to enjoy themselves; for they know 
full well they are not loved nor lovable; perfectly certain it is impossible to share their 
experience' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 605). Though this passage is overtly about physical 
deformity and physical ugliness, it can be and perhaps is intended to be applied to moral 
deformity as well. Uncharacteristically, at one point, Sade allows Clement to admit that certain 
tastes are abnormal and perhaps unhealthy when in the past Sade had always defended 
barbarous impulses by claiming they are natural. Here we see a speck of illumination into his 
own condition enter into Sade's consciousness: 'The man endowed with uncommon tastes is 
sick; if you prefer, he is like a woman subject to hysterical vapors' (602). Though most of 
Sade's work is geared toward defending his decadence, there is some small part of him that 
acknowledges that his proclivities are not natural and not even particularly desirable; that it is, 
in fact, more desirable to live within humanity than on the fringes of it: 'What living man 
would not instantly revise his tastes, his affections, his penchants and bring them into harmony 
with the general scheme, what man rather than continue a freak, would not prefer to be like 
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everyone else?' (602). 
It is the total disconnection from human fellowship which Eliot finds most damning. 
Grandcourt, like Clement in Justine, senses his own deformity (he is no longer able to love or 
truly care for anyone), and is angered at the recognition of it that is slowly brought about by 
his wife's disgust. To Eliot, no one is entirely unconscious of anything: Theophrastus tells us 
that 'even what we are averse to, what we vow not to entertain, must have shaped or shadowed 
itself within us as a possibility before we can think of exorcising it' (Impressions 4). 
Grandcourt certainly has a general human desire to be admired: in fact, he requires even more 
recognition than those whose personhood is situated on firmer ground. His dependence on 
others' perceptions is proved through his denial of it: 'Grandcourt went about with the sense 
that he did not care a languid curse for anyone's admiration' (585). Undoubtedly, the phrase 
'went about' convinces us of the opposite sentiment: in the next line, Eliot demonstrates that 
Grandcourt's identity is currently founded on his contempt for mankind: 'the state of non-
caring' which is the base of his sense of self 'just as much as desire require[s] its related object' 
(585). Furthermore, Grandcourt is painfully conscious of how his every action appears to 
others: he 'tenaciously avoid[ed] the possible suggestion to anybody concerned that Deronda's 
presence or absence could be of the least importance to him' and since Gwendolen as his wife 
is most responsible for preserving his sense of self, her opinion is of prime importance: 'he 
made no direct observation to Gwendolen on her behaviour that evening, lest the expression of 
his disgust should be a little too strong to satisfy his own pride' (586). Clearly and perhaps 
sadly, Grandcourt's current relation to self is wholly based on how he is perceived by other 
people as well as his maintenance of a feeling of superiority to and disdain for the rest of 
mankind. His dependent, unstable identity is comparable to Theophrastus's example of the 
mollusc that is 'inwardly objecting to every other grade of solid other than himself' (41). The 
mollusc, whose flimsiness resembles an unstable sense of self, looks on at those beings with a 
fixed identity as a quite contemptible species. 
At the start of Daniel Deronda Gwendolen is also characterized as having a natural disdain for 
her fellow beings but, as Eliot demonstrates, only a few strong attachments to other human 
beings are necessary in order to revise this character trait. Gwendolen's two attachments are to 
her mother and later to Deronda. Gwendolen's initial attachment to her mother is what, in fact, 
prevents her from succumbing to total egoism. It is noteworthy that Eliot uses an event from 
Gwendolen's childhood in which she strangles her sister's canary (25) in order to bring out her 
egoism. In Sade's Philosophy in the Bedroom, 1795, this example is also used by D01mance to 
illustrate that amorality is an inborn trait: 'the infant breaks his toy, bites his nurse's breast, 
strangles his canary long before he is able to reason' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 253). As 
earlier stated, it is certainly possible that Eliot could have read this text; regardless of whether 
or not she has, the statement 'strangles his canary long before he is able to reason' is useful for 
analyzing Gwendolen. Gwendolen, at the start of the novel, is surely not able fully to reason, 
because she has not yet developed her imaginative intellect. She cannot envision her action 
engendering consequences that will result not only in her sister's unhappiness and the 
extinction of the bird's life, but that she herself will never be free from the repercussions of 
what she deems an 'infelonious murder' (25); just as years later, she will not be able to imagine 
that her betrayal of Lydia Glasher will have inescapable emotional consequences. 
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The inability to envision consequences is also an issue explored by Sade; Clement points out 
that 'When one wishes to delight in any action whatsoever, there is never a question of 
consequences' (qtd. in Seaver and Wainhouse 607). Dolmance in Philosophy in the Bedroom 
also expounds on this issue: '[The rascals are inclined] in accordance with natural impulsions 
to prefer what they feel to what they do not feel' (252). These infantile attitudes are very 
present in Gwendolen's character, although she is shown to be remorseful once she has seen 
the negative effects her actions have had on others. Her ability to empathize imaginatively 
comes, however, out of this egoism; it is the recognition of her own pain that forces her to 
acknowledge pain in others. In Sade, victimizers are not victimized and these favourable 
circumstances allow them to maintain a belief in barbarity because it is convenient for them. 
After Justine tells Clement she will never accept his 'dangerous lubricity' Clement responds, 
'[You will not accept it] because you are afraid of becoming its object, there you have it: 
egoism. Let's exchange the roles and you will fancy it very nicely' (qtd. in Seaver and 
Wainhouse 608). This argument is faulty, because it assumes that once one knows what it is 
like to suffer, one will still remain indifferent to the suffering of others. Eliot's rhetoric would 
argue that the experience of prolonged suffering is transformative: it makes a permanent 
alteration in the egoist's perception of the self and the others. This is why Eliot's worst villains 
tend to be the recipients of good fortune and sometimes come from aristocratic circumstances. 
The villain in Silas Mamer is the son of the village squire; Dempster in Scenes of a Clerical 
Life only knows what it is like to be a tyrant and not the experience of being bullied; Rosamond 
in Middlemarch is spoiled by her parents. Tito, too, is pampered, and though his anguished 
moments are portrayed, they fail to convince; like Rosamond, his times of distress are short-
lived. Rosamond and Tito manage, for the most part, to manipulate their circumstances in order 
to avoid long periods of unhappiness (and in Tito's case, remorse as well); but Gwendolen 
cannot escape Lydia Glasher nor can she flee the everyday miseries of living with Grandcourt; 
she is literally trapped in and thereby made constantly subject to guilt and suffering. 
Daniel Deronda's subtext hints that Grandcourt not only psychologically torments Gwendolen 
but that his oppression may include subjecting her to perverse or cruel sexual practices. Rignall 
points out that 'there is a suggestion of sexual sadism in the repeated images of horses, reins, 
whips, and bridles used to define Grandcourt's subjection of Gwendolen' (RignalI83). Indeed, 
it is not farfetched to venture that Grandcourt's perception of Gwendolen as a woman who is 
'brought to kneel down like a horse under training for the arena' (320) and his constant 
emphasis on his role as 'master' might possibly extend into the bedroom. References to 
Gwendolen's fear of Grandcourt suggest this since the rest of the book makes it clear that 
Gwendolen is not one who is easily cowed by intimidation. Sexual fright is indicated when 
Gwendolen reflects on her current situation: 
For she did think of the coming years with presentiment: she was frightened at 
Grandcourt. The poor thing had passed from her girlish sauciness of superiority 
over this inert specimen of personal distinction into an amazed perception of 
her former ignorance about the possible mental attitude of a man towards the 
woman he sought in marriage - of her present ignorance as to what their life 
with each other might turn into (425). 
This passage likely indicates more than moral repulsion; Gwendolen's emotion toward 
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Grandcourt has stretched beyond disdain for the man's character and into the realm of terror at 
what she perceives lies in store for her as his wife. The use of the adjective 'inert' implies that 
Gwendolen underestimated Grandcourt's sexual stamina; it is obvious in the descriptions of her 
musings on what married life would be, that she discounted the sexual; and it is possible that 
she did so because Grandcourt appeared remote and unenergetic: Gwendolen notices upon 
meeting him that it is 'perhaps not possible for a breathing man to look less animated' (111). 
There is a lack of visible sexuality in Grandcourt that appeals to Gwendolen: 'He did not 
appear to enjoy anything much. That was not necessary: and the less he had of particular tastes 
and desires, the more freedom his wife would have in following hers' (137). 'Particular tastes 
and desires' seem definitely to include sexuality, and a few lines later she compares Grandcourt 
to a lizard and 'not one of the lively, darting kind' (137). It is perhaps Gwendolen's hope that 
Grandcourt is impotent. This is shown to be anything but the case: 'the thoughts [Gwendolen's 
image] stirred would be imperfectly illustrated by a reference to the amatory poets of all ages' 
(319). Might the likes of Baudelaire, Sade, or any other lascivious unnamed French writers that 
Theophrastus finds fault with more accurately describe Grandcourt's feelings for Gwendolen? 
Grandcourt, like the deviants Sade describes, can only feel alive when he is overriding 
another's will or causing pain; otherwise, he is bored to the point of stupefaction. Grandcourt 
is not as educated or well-read as he would like to appear to be; instead of developing his 
intellect: 'he employed himself (as a philosopher might have done) in sitting meditatively on a 
sofa and abstaining from literature' (319). He does this 'not from love of thought, but from 
hatred of effort.' Eliot describes this kind of mental sleep as an 'inward world' or a state of 
mind composed entirely of the ego, where 'impulse is born and dies in a phantasmal world, 
pausing in rejection of even a shadowy fulfillment' (319). This kind of ennui fails to recognize 
its own dissatisfaction and remains on the periphery of imagination; but because it is barely 
visible makes it no less dangerous: 'a lazy stagnation or even a cottony milkiness may be 
preparing one knows not what biting or explosive material' (319). If Grandcourt were to 
ground his intellect firmly in the pursuit of knowledge, this rootless imaginative wandering 
would not gather destructive momentum. As it stands, Grandcourt's thoughts concerning 
Gwendolen 'were like circlets one sees in a dark pool continually dying out and starting again 
from some impulse below the surface' (319). Grandcourt's consciousness, depicted as not only 
mindless and animalistic in its nature, is seen as repetitive in its processes. These kinds of 
obsessive and mechanistic processes are sure to produce only evil; in these short descriptions 
of Grandcourt's mental composition, immorality is seen as rooted in ennui: the antidote to 
which is education and study. Much later, Eliot italicizes the word 'ennui' when describing our 
relation to the 'beings closest to us whether in love or hate' and how 'their trivial sentences, 
their petty standards, their low suspicions, their loveless ennui, may be making somebody 
else's life no better than a promenade through a pantheon of ugly idols' (672). Lack of concern 
for humanity, denoted here as the absence of love, is directly linked to boredom/want of 
purpose in life. 
Eliot portrays Gwendolen's restlessness and ennui as part of her initially amoral nature. At the 
very beginning of the novel, Deronda questions whether the power of Gwendolen's gaze 
resides in the 'good or the evil genius dominant in those beams'; and concludes that the 'evil' 
is in fact dominant 'else why the effect of unrest?' (7). Though this as much a critique of 
Deronda's naive perceptions and the equally naive society which expects women to suppress 
32 
rather than develop their intellects, it is also a statement on the correlation between immoral 
actions and the want of creative or intellectual quests. There is a crucial difference, however, 
between the way ennui functions in Gwendolen and the manner in which it operates in 
Grandcourt; in Gwendolen it produces restlessness, but Grandcourt's response is further to 
withdraw from life. Lydia Glasher's letter provides valuable insights into Grandcourt's 
psychology: 'The man you have married has a withered heart. His best young love was mine 
[ .. .]' (359). Grandcourt's thought processes show that his intellect too is withered, 'a condition 
which comes like whitening hair [ ... J like the main trunk of an exorbitant egoism' (319). 
Whitening hair entails the death of pigment in the root of a hair follicle and a consequent loss 
of colour; and the tree imagery 'main trunk' also supports the idea that Eliot believed 
consciousness to be grounded in something larger than itself. Because Grandcourt's is only 
rooted in his own 'exorbitant egoism' and nothing larger than itself, his consciousness becomes 
static. The connection between 'heart' or a larger moral nature, and imagination is indefatigable 
in Eliot. Theophrastus finds an irrefutable connection between these two concepts and 
emphasizes the importance of 'ennobling emotions which subdue the tyranny of suffering, and 
make ambition one with social virtue' (84). Ambition is always imaginative and it is always 
wedded to the desire to inspire these values in others. Theophrastus insists that the man whose 
work is a 'negation of those moral sensibilities which make half the warp and woof of human 
history' cannot 'be taken, even by his own generation, as a living proof that there can exist such 
a combination as that of moral stupidity and trivial emphasis on personal indulgence' 
(Impressions 136). To George Eliot, there is an irreconcilable gulf between low morale and 
creative genius; that is why she presents Grandcourt as ghostlike, he is already spiritually and 
mentally dead so that all that remains of him are ebbs of thought which move in circular 
patterns. Grandcourt's sexual impulse then, joined with his fantasies of dominion and 
humiliation, not only has the effect of diminishing Gwendolen's sense of self; it reduces him 
to a mere ebbing impulse, a pulsation. 
Simone de Beauvoir's essay Must We Burn Sade? identifies the same alienation in Sade, whose 
work can be viewed as a constant effort to reconcile that sense of hopeless estrangement from 
the rest of humanity with a wish to be somehow connected. De Beauvoir points out that Sade 
'for all his sadism strove to compensate for the one necessary element which he lacked' (De 
Beauvoir 32). De Beauvoir compares Sade's condition to an 'autism which prevented him 
from ever forgetting himself or being genuinely aware of the reality of the other person' (De 
Beauvoir 33). What De Beauvoir describes is not simply a consequence of egoism but a 
deficiency in the imagination. Applied to Gwendolen and Grandcourt, it is obvious that 
Gwendolen begins life as ego-driven but not without the creative intellect requisite in order to 
imagine and thereby empathize with another's suffering. Grandcourt fails at putting another's 
needs ahead of his own and at even the very act of fully envisaging the effects his cruelties will 
have on another's consciousness. Sadism and masochism are both efforts on the part of a 
diminished consciousness to feel again; in De Beauvoir's words, 'If the subject remains 
confined within the solitude of his consciousness, he escapes this agitation and can rejoin the 
other only by conscious performance' (33). The performative aspect of desire, clearly a feature 
of Sade's writing, also applies to Grandcourt's spectator mentality: he likes Lush to watch him 
mistreat Fetch (125); he likes Gwendolen to wear Lydia Glasher's diamonds in public (427). 
Clearly this exhibitionistic aspect of Grandcourt's sadism is what most gratifies him: 
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Grandcourt had an intense satisfaction in leading his wife captive after this 
fashion: it gave their life on a small scale a royal representation and pUblicity 
in which everything familiar was gotten rid of, and everybody must do what 
was expected of them whatever might be their private protest-(the protest 
kept strictly private) adding to the piquancy of despotism (672) 
Grandcourt has changed from a younger man who might have loved Lydia Glasher (in her 
perception, he had loved her so this question is effectively posed) to a man who lives solely for 
the pleasures of 'representation' and the thrilling contrast between what is public and what 
remains veiled. 
There is an unmistakable similitude between Grandcourt and Lapidoth, who had 'travelled a 
long way' from his 'young self', and to whom emotion is now like 'the ocular perception of 
touch to one who has lost the sense of touch, or like morsels on an untasting palette, having 
shape and grain, but no flavour' (Deronda 742). The narrator refers to masochism as a 
preferable and even welcome alternative to this condition: the loss of emotion and human 
sympathy is likened to a 'slow death' where one 'longs to feel laceration rather than be 
conscious of a widening margin where consciousness once was' (742). Baldassarre, too, has 
reached this reduced state: the only way he retains his identity is through his identification with 
his hatred. This loathing becomes his only source of human contact and so he declares 'I am 
not alone in the world; 1 shall never be alone, for my revenge is with me' (Romola 256). 
Sentiments of sadism and masochism are married in Baldassarre's fantasy of 'an eternity of 
vengeance, where he, an undying hate, might clutch forever an undying traitor' (257-258). 
There is no happiness in this condition, but there is a sharing of misery which appeals to 
Baldassarre; and it is notable that Eliot's language reduces Baldassarre to only an emotion, he 
is 'undying hate' rather than simply the custodian to such animosity. Eliot without doubt looks 
upon the passion of hatred more favourably than she does the impartial and cold emotions of 
Lapidoth and Grandcourt. Grandcourt, Lapidoth, and Baldassarre are varying forms of a 
devolutionary process: Baldassarre is still linked to humanity by his passionately realized hate; 
Lapidoth is numbed but not prone to cruelty, only egoism; Grandcourt is insensate to the point 
of having entirely lost his soul to some phantom form of consciousness. 
To be sure, Eliot meant these characters to serve as a warning that the more one detaches from 
the collective consciousness, the greater the chance one takes that one's own consciousness 
will be erased. That could have happened to Gwendolen but her love for Deronda prevents it. 
She starts with the Sadiean belief that 'whatever surrounded her was somehow specially for 
her' (Daniel Deronda 804) but the imaginative intellect she possesses innately grows more 
powerful the more her consciousness is thrust into being by extreme suffering. She comes into 
the recognition of suffering as a 'collective risk' by her own frightful introduction to it and 
attempts to accept her 'amazed anguish that 1 and not Thou, He or She, should be just the 
smitten one' (289). By the end of the novel, Gwendolen has completely transcended her 
previous incarnation of self and like Romola, experiences 'the peaceful melancholy which 
comes from the renunciation of the demands of self' and takes comfort from the 'more starlike 
out-glowing of some pure fellow-feeling, some generous impulse breaking our inner darkness' 
(795). This seeming diminishment of Gwendolen's former liveliness is seen as preferable to her 
previous rowdy egoism; 1 believe Eliot intends Gwendolen's melancholy to be seen as a latent 
34 
period, a rest after all her agonies that will allow her to meet her full creative and human 
potential later. 
Eliot's philosophy comes closest to the surface during a telling conversation between Mirah 
and Mordecai over the emotions of a Jewish maiden in a tale Mordecai cites from the Midrash. 
It is likely Eliot favoured Mordecai's claim that the maiden's sacrifice of her self illustrated 
'surpassing love that loses self in the object of love' over Mirah's counter-argument that the 
maiden 'had wanted the king to know what she had done and to feel that she was better than 
the other', that 'it was her strong self, wanting to conquer, that made her die' (735). Mordecai 
chides his sister, 'Thou hast read too many plays, where the writers delight in showing the 
human passions as indwelling demons, unmixed with the relenting and devout elements of the 
soul' (735). 
It is obvious that Eliot herself, unlike the unidentified French writers in Impressions, was 
keenly interested in showing both 'the indwelling demons' and the 'the relenting and devout 
elements of the human soul'; but that her life's work was geared toward advocating the latter. 
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